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ARGUMENT

I.

Introduction.
The City readily concedes in its Respondent's Briefthat when Alpine filed its

development applications Alpine was faced with a non-discretionary, non-variable Ordinance
that required Alpine to provide community housing units as part of its condominium project.
The Ordinance (Ordinance No. 819) required developers of residential subdivisions to provide
"community housing units" equal in number to a specified percentage ofthe total units in the
subdivision.] These community housing units were required to be deed restricted units available
for purchase or rent only by income qualified persons. 2
At the core ofthe case before this Court is the issue of whether Alpine's noncompliance
with I.C. §50-219 deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider the undisputed facts upon which
Alpine contends that its non-compliance should be excused. Rather than address the merits of
Alpine's argument as to whether the requirements ofLC. §50-219 are jurisdictional, the City,
instead, chooses to mischaracterize Alpine's position as being that the notice requirement of the
statute "is optional". Respondent's Briefat 13. That is of course not Alpine's position, nor has it
ever been Alpine's position in this litigation. Rather, Alpine argues that neither LC. §50-219,
nor I.C. §6-908 (which the District Court held is applied to Alpine's claim against the City,
through I.C. §50-219) contain the clear and unequivocal language which is required to divest this

1 Alpine

Village is considered a "subdivision" under the McCall City Code.
Ordinance 819 was codified as McCall City Code §9.7.1O. R., Ex. II (Ex. 3). It allowed an applicant who was
subject to the Ordinance to comply in anyone or a combination of the following four ways: (i) to build community
housing units on the site ofthe development; (ii) to build or provide the community housing units off-site; (iii) to
provide land for the construction of community housing units; and/or (iv) to pay an "in lieu fee".
2
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Court of jurisdiction. As a consequence, this Court is free to consider the unique facts of this
case as they relate to Alpine's equal protection and estoppel claims.
The City does not dispute the fact that, after Ordinances 819 and 829 were declared
unconstitutional, the City invited and paid refund requests from fifty-eight other parties who had
paid community housing fees pursuant to Ordinance 820. The accrual date for these claims
would unquestionably have been the date on which the fees were paid. The City accepted and
paid refund requests which were submitted as long as/orty-three months after the fees had been
paid. The City did not assert I.C. §50-219 as a bar or defense to any of these refund requests,
although the City admits that it could have done so. Yet, when Alpine's claim was submitted to
the City within a lesser time frame than was allowed to the aforesaid refund claimants, the City
invoked I.C. §50-219 as a bar to the claim? Rather than offering any explanation or rationale
whatsoever for this disparate treatment of Alpine, the City simply argues that there was no
disparate treatment, because Alpine was "made whole" by the City's release of the community
housing restrictions on the Timbers units more than seventeen months after Alpine's purchase of
the Timbers complex. 4 This position is both factually and legally unsustainable.
On the issue of whether Alpine's federal claim is "ripe" under "prong I" ofthe U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank 0/
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985), the City argues that
Alpine's federal claim fails because Alpine failed to "probe alternatives" to the acquisition ofthe

3 The District Court held that Alpine's state constitutional claim accrued not later than December 13,2007. Alpine's
claim was delivered to the City on November 15, 2010, or approximately thirty-five months after the date of accrual.
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Timbers units. Respondent's Briefat 32. The City contends that Alpine could have proposed a
less intrusive manner of compliance with Ordinance 819 which would have eliminated or
mitigated Alpine's subsequent takings claim. Id p. 30-32. The principal problem with this
argument is that it ignores the undisputed facts of record. The community housing plan which
Alpine initially proposed would have used mobile horne spaces already owned by Alpine to
satisfy the Ordinance's requirements on an interim basis, to be replaced by permanently
designated off site units in Phase 3 ofthe project. R., Ex. II (Ex. 4). This plan was precisely the
kind of plan which the City now argues Alpine should have proposed; namely, a plan which
would not have required Alpine to acquire property prior to the disposition of the Mountain

Central Board ofRealtors litigation. 5 Yet, as the City concedes, this plan was rej ected by the
City. Respondent's Briefat 9. Thus, despite being faced with the prospect that its Ordinance
might be invalidated in the pending litigation, the City continued to enforce the Ordinance and
rejected the very kind of plan which the City now suggests might have avoided this litigation.
The City offered Alpine two choices: (i) abandon its applications, or (ii) present a plan which
complied with the Ordinance and which designated the off-site community housing units for the
entire project.
The other alternative which the City contends could have been utilized by Alpine in
satisfaction of its community housing obligations was to pay an "in lieu" fee. Under the
Ordinance, this fee would have been calculated based on the cost to the City of constructing or

The Timbers was a condominium complex which was purchased by Alpine solely to comply with the community
housing requirement.
5 Mountain Central Board a/Realtors, Inc. v. City a/McCall (Valley Case No. CV-2006-490-C)
4
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acquiring community housing units. Curiously, the City's position is that, had Alpine done so,
the City would have refunded the in lieu fee when Ordinance 819 was declared unconstitutional.
Respondent's Brief at 31. Yet, the City's position in this litigation is that it is under no legal or
equitable obligation whatsoever to refund to Alpine any of the money which Alpine expended in
providing the very same units itself.

II.

This Court is not divested of jurisdiction to consider Alpine's claims that it should
be excused from compliance with I.e. §50-219.
The District Court found that the provisions ofI.C. §6-908 are applicable to Alpine's

claim via I.C. §50-219. 6 Assuming arguendo that I.e. §6-908 is applicable to Alpine's state
constitutional takings claim, the issue before this Court is not whether Alpine is entitled to
disregard I.C. §50-219 or whether compliance with the statute is a "condition precedent" to the
pursuit of a claim for damages against the City. The narrow issue presented by this case is
whether this Court is deprived of jurisdiction to consider Alpine's claims that its noncompliance
with the statute should be excused. Stated otherwise, the issue is whether either I.C. §50-219 or
I.e. §6-908, on their face, contain sufficiently clear and unequivocal evidence of a legislative
intent to overcome the presumption of jurisdiction which this Court has held is enjoyed by courts
of general jurisdiction. 7
While Alpine recognizes that the Court of Appeals described compliance with the ITCA
as a jurisdictional requirement in Madsen v. Idaho Dept. ofHealth & Welfare, 116 Idaho 758,
779 P.2d 433, eCt. App. 1989), Alpine respectively submits that this issue has never been

6

In its Opening Brief, Alpine has challenged that holding and will not re-visit those arguments in this Reply.
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squarely addressed by this Court. The simple fact of the matter is that a holding that the statute
is a "condition precedent" to the pursuit of a claim does not answer the question of whether noncompliance is jurisdictional. Although the issues of actual or constructive notice arose in two of
the cases cited by the City, it does not appear that any defense to noncompliance with the statute
was asserted in any of the cases cited by the City, let alone a defense which was based on the
conduct of the state or municipality. In such cases, this Court would have had no reason to
address the issue presented herein. The issue has, however, arisen and been analyzed in a
significant number of other jurisdictions. It is for this reason that Alpine has presented the
decisions of those jurisdictions to this Court for consideration. The City has elected to not
respond to, discuss, or refute any of the reasoning or holdings in the cases cited by Alpine, nor to
address the underlying and well established principle that courts of general jurisdiction are not to
be deprived of that jurisdiction casually or impliedly.
This Court's implicit recognition of this principle and of the legitimate legal distinction
between a condition precedent which is jurisdictional and one which is procedural is evidenced
in the language ofLR.C.P. 84(n), which provides:
(n) Effect of Failure to Comply With Time Limits. The failure to physically file a
petition for judicial review or cross-petition for judicial review with the district
cOUli within the time limits prescribed by statute and these rules shall be
jurisdictional and shall cause automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial
review upon motion of any party, or upon initiative of the district court. Failure
of a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review shall not
be deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action or
sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of
the petitionfor review. (emphasis added).
7 See Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 80, 218 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2009); Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,78,
205 P.3d, 2019,1214 (2009).
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Alpine submits that the correct legal holding under the facts of this case would be
that the requisite legislative intent to elevate the requirements ofI.C. §50-219 or I.C. §6908 to jurisdictional requirements is simply lacking. As a result, Alpine's constitutional
and equitable arguments that the City should not be allowed to assert the statute against
Alpine as a bar should be considered. Because those arguments are based on
uncontrovelied facts and were presented below as paIi of the cross motions for summary
judgment, they are ripe for review and resolution by this Court.

III.

The City should be held to be constitutionally and equitably barred from
asserting I.e. §50-219 as a defense to Alpine's state takings claim.
A.

Alpine's equal protection claim.

Alpine recognizes that the rational basis test which is applicable to Alpine's equal
protection claim affords substantial deference to the City's explanation of the basis for
distinguishing the treatment which was afforded to Alpine, as opposed to the other fifty-eight
persons who were adversely impacted by the City's companion Ordinances 819 and 820.
However, despite repeated invitations in this litigation to do so, the City has offered no basis for
the disparate treatment. Instead, the City denies that there was any disparate treatment because
Alpine received "the equivalent of a full refund." Respondent's Brief at 17. This asseliion flies
in the face of the undisputed facts of record.
Fifty-eight other persons who were adversely affected by Ordinances 819 and 820 were
given up to forty-three months to asseli their refund claims. R., Vol. III, p. 402. Although the
City readily acknowledges that it could have asserted I.C. §50-219 as a bar to each and everyone
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of those claims, it declined to do so. Alpine's claim was filed approximately thirty-five months
after the date on which the District Court held that the claim accrued. For the first time, the City
asserted I.C. §50-219 as a bar to the claim. The only difference between the claims regarding
which the City waived I.C. §50-219 and Alpine's claim is that the other claimants paid their
money to the City, while Alpine's money was paid to a third party. However, the City does not
assert this distinction as the basis for the disparate treatment. Instead, the City claims that Alpine
received the equivalent of a full refund when the City released the community housing
restrictions on the Timbers units more than seventeen months after Alpine's purchase of the
Timbers complex.
This proposition belies the fact that the City temporarily invaded and possessed two of
Alpine's constitutionally protected property rights; namely, Alpine's money and Alpine's right
to freely exclude people from and dispose of its property. Having done so, as the U.S. Supreme
Court held in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,
321, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2389,96 L.Ed. 2d 250 (1987), "[W]here the government's activities have
already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective." Alpine has not received one dime of compensation from the City for these takings.
In any event, the City's arguments miss the essence of Alpine's equal protection claim.
The issue is whether the City has offered any rational basis for waiving I.C. §50-219 as to all of
the other claimants under the unconstitutional companion Ordinances 819 and 820 and allowing
those claimants up to fOliy-three months after the accrual of their claims to notify the City,
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while asseliing that Alpine's claim must have been filed within 180 days after its accrual. The
answer is that the City has not offered any basis for the disparate treatment, instead continuing
to deny that it occurred. The issue is not how the City would have responded to Alpine's state
takings claim, but why Alpine was not afforded the same latitude in asserting it.

B.

Alpine's estoppel claim.

The City argues that "[E]stoppel cannot operate to grant subject matter jurisdiction,
which, as we have noted above, is lacking here." Respondent's Briefat 17. The City cites City of

Eagle v. Idaho Department a/Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 247 P.3d 1037 (2011) in support
ofthis proposition. This is the classically circular argument. The very reason why Alpine's
estoppel argument can and should be considered is that neither I.C. §50-219 nor I.C. §6-908 are
jurisdictional. The estoppel argument does not grant subject matter jurisdiction, it prevents the
City from inequitably asserting a procedural statute as a bar in this case. The City ofEagle case
is entirely consistent with Alpine's position. Therein, this Court held that the doctrine of quasiestoppel could not be applied to extend the 28-day period for appeal of an administrative
decision, because the 28-day appeal period was a jurisdictional requirement under I.R.C.P. 84(n).
The critical distinction in City 0/Eagle is that I.R.C.P. 84(n) provides that: "The failure to
physically file a petition for judicial review or cross-petition for judicial review with the district
court within the time limits prescribed by statute and these rules shall be jurisdictional and shall

cause automatic dismissal a/the petitionfor judicial review . ... "(emphasis added). No such
language exists either in I.C. §50-219 or I.C. §6-906.
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Once again, the City elects to mischaracterize Alpine's estoppel argument, rather than
addressing its merits. The City suggests that "Alpine contends that the City changed its position
by refunding money it collected under Ordinance 820 while declining to further reimburse
Alpine after releasing it from restrictions imposed under Ordinance 819." Respondent's Briefat
18. The issue presented by Alpine's estoppel argument is not whether the City's denial of
Alpine's claim constituted an impermissible change of position, but, rather, whether the City
should be estopped from changing its position as to whether it would assert I.C. §50-219 as a bar
to claims resulting from the City's imposition of the community housing ordinances.
Next, the City invites this Court to adopt the proposition that it is Alpine who changed its
position, arguing that: "As shown in an e-mail from counsel for Alpine to the City on April 26,
2008 (two days after the City repealed Ordinance 819), Alpine sought nothing more than a

release of the housing restrictions on the Timbers ... " (emphasis added). Respondent's Briefat
18. The e-mail in question states in pertinent paIi as follows:
Lindley,
I am assuming that, given the Mountain Central Board of Realtors Decision and
the subsequent repeal of Ordinance No. 819, the City is prepared to release Alpine
Village from its community housing plan. Toward that end, I have attached a
"First Amendment to Development Agreement" which does so.
R., Vol. III, p. 422.
Alpine was obviously obliged to seek a release of the community housing restrictions on
the Timbers units, as part of Alpine's duty to mitigate its damages. There is nothing in the
subject e-mail which justifies the City'S suggestion that the release made Alpine whole, or that
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the release is all that Alpine was seeking, or that Alpine stated any position in the e-mail which
has changed.
Lastly, the City argues that Alpine has not shown that it relied to its detriment on the
City's waiver ofI.C. §50-219 in the fifty-eight other claims made after the community housing
ordinances were declared unconstitutional and invalid on their face. The City does not cite any
authority for the proposition that reliance is an element of a claim of quasi estoppel. That is
because it is not. 8
The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that Alpine did no more than comply in
good faith with the non-discretionary city ordinances which applied to its applications. Alpine
proposed a less intrusive community housing plan which would not have required it to acquire or
build any community housing units prior to the outcome ofthe Mountain Central Board of
Realtors litigation. That plan was rejected by the City. The City had control of this process at
every turn and called the shots. Alpine had no way of knowing whether that litigation would last
months or years, what the decision of the District Court would be, or that the City would elect
not to appeal the adverse District Court decision. After the Ordinances were invalidated, the
community housing restrictions were released and Alpine had the opportunity to evaluate the
mess with which it was left, it filed a claim with the City that was every bit as timely as the other
claims which were filed with and paid by the City. The only reason that the City then, for the
first time, asserted I.C. §50-219 as a bar to the claim is that the City fears the claim will be
substantially larger than the other claims which the City has accepted and paid. To allow the

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

PAGE 10

City to isolate Alpine's claim under these facts would be unconscionable; and, the City has not
offered this Court any legitimate basis to hold otherwise.
IV.

Alpine's state takings/inverse condemnation claim was timely filed under
I.e. §5-224.
The City, for the first time in this litigation, asserts that LC. §6-911 might be the

governing statute of limitations in this case. Respondent's Brief at 19. This is in direct conflict
not only with the precedent established by this Court but with the positions taken by the City
throughout this litigation. In the City's Opening Brief in Support ofMotion to Dismiss, filed in
the United States District Court after the City removed the case to federal court, the City asserted
that "Alpine's state takings claim is subject to Idaho's residual four-year statute of limitations,
Idaho Code §5-224." R., Ex. II (Ex. 24, p.7). This position was repeated by the City after the
case was remanded, in the City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R.,
Vol. II, p. 317) and in City's Reply Brief in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment and

Response Brief in Opposition to Alpine's Alotion for Summary Judgment (R., Vol. III, p. 440).
The City was correct in these assertions. The Statute of Limitations which applies to Alpine's
state constitutional claim is LC. §5-224. 9
The City contends that Alpine's state cause of action accrued on the day that Alpine filed
its Applications. Contrary to the City's statement that this position is supported by a "mountain
of appellate precedent" (Respondent's Briefat 20), just the opposite is true. As Alpine discussed
in its Opening Brief, this Court has stated in numerous decisions that a takings/inverse

8
9

See Willigv. State Dept. o/Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261,899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995).
McCuskey v. Canyon County Com'rs, 128 Idaho 213,217,912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996).
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condemnation cause of action accrues "after the full extent of the impailment of the plaintiffs'
use and enjoyment of [the property] becomes apparent." Tibbs v. City ofSandpoint, 100 Idaho
667,671,603 P.2d 1001,1005 (1979) (quoting Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798,802,160
Ct.Cl. 295 (1963)). It is important to recognize that in Tibbs, this Court was also deciding when
damages in an inverse condemnation case accrued, "both the extent and the measure of damages,
are inextricably fixed by a finding of the time of taking." Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670,603 P.2d at
1004. The Tibbs Court concluded that the time of the taking, the accrual ofthe taking claim, and
the time from which to measure a plaintiffs damages, although not readily susceptible to exact
detelmination, must all be fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, ofsuch a degree
and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became
apparent. The City's entire argument on this issue extracts the word "apparent" but attaches it to
a completely different concept, arguing that, when Alpine filed its application, it was "apparent"
that it might somehow be impacted by Ordinance 819. That is simply not the standard in Idaho
for determining the accrual date of a takings claim such as the claim being asserted by Alpine.
The undisputed facts of this case support the District Comi's holding that Alpine's state
takings/inverse condemnation claim accrued on December 13,2007, when the Development
Agreement for Alpine Village was signed, dedicating all seventeen of the Timbers units as
community housing units for Alpine Village. R., Vol. III, p. 528. When Alpine filed its
Applications, it simply could have had no idea of how Ordinance 819 would be applied to its
project. The Ordinance had only been recently enacted and had no history of application to
development applications. The impact on Alpine of its initially proposed Community Housing
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Plan bears no resemblance to the impairment of Alpine's property interests which resulted from
the Plan which Alpine was required to propose, after its initial Plan was rejected. Under
Ordinance 819, only the City Council had authority to review and approve a Community
Housing Plan. Alpine's applications did not even reach the City Council until December 13,
2006, when the City Council conducted its first public hearing on the project; and, even then, the
Council deferred consideration of the Plan until Alpine's Final Plat was submitted. R., Ex. II (Ex.
9, p.3, Finding No. 18 and p. 6, Conclusion No. 2.12). The Final Plat and the revised
Community Housing Plan for the project were not reviewed and approved by the Council until
August 23,2007. R., Ex. II, (Ex. 15). Throughout this period oftime, the Council was
determining how it would proceed in light of the Mountain Central Board of Realtors litigation,
whether it would continue to process Alpine's Applications and whether it would continue to
impose the Ordinance on Alpine. The unusual factual record in this case belies any credible
argument that, when Alpine filed its Applications, it could have had any clear understanding of
how its property interests would ultimately be affected by the application of the Ordinance.
The City has cited McCuskey for the proposition that Alpine's claim accrued on the date
on which Alpine first filed its applications with the City, because Ordinance 819 was then in
effect. However, McCuskey simply does not support this argument. A review of the facts of

McCuskey helps explain why. McCuskey acquired the subject property in 1978. A year later,
Canyon County adopted an ordinance which had the effect of "down zoning" McCuskey's
property. Seven years later, in 1986, McCuskey obtained a building permit for a use which does
not appear to have been allowed by the County's zoning ordinance. The County promptly issued
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a stop work order. McCuskey sued (but did not allege a taking or inverse condemnation), and in
1993 the Supreme Court held that the subj ect zoning ordinance was void (the McCuskey I
decision). Then, in 1994, McCuskey filed an inverse condemnation action against the County.
The Supreme Court held that the inverse condemnation action accrued not when the "down
zone" ordinance was adopted (in 1979) and not when McCuskey I was decided (in 1993), but,
rather, when the stop work order was issued, reasoning that:
[T]his Court has decided that damages for inverse condemnation should be
assessed at the time the taking occurs. Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,
670,603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979) (citation omitted). The time of taking occurs,
and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the
plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the propeliy becomes apparent.
Intermountain West, 111 Idaho at 880, 728 P.2d at 769 (citing Tibbs, 100 Idaho at
671,603 P.2d at 1005).
McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 217,912 P.2d at 104.

If Alpine was arguing that its inverse condemnation action did not accrue until the
Mountain Central Board of Realtors decision was issued, the City's citation of McCuskey would

be appropriate. However, that is not Alpine's position. Consistent with McCuskey, Alpine is
arguing that its inverse condemnation action accrued not on the date that Ordinance 819 was
adopted and not on the date on which the Mountain Central Board ofRealtors decision was
issued, but, rather, when the full extent of Alpine's loss of use and enjoyment of its
constitutionally protected property rights became apparent. As the District Court held, this
occurred on December 13,2007, when Alpine executed the Development Agreement for Alpine
Village, committing to dedicate the Timbers units as community housing units. Under the
undisputed facts of record, the earliest that this could be said to have occurred was on March 22,
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2007 when,for the first time, Alpine's proposed acquisition and dedication ofthe Timbers units
as community housing units for Alpine Village was approved by the City Council. In either
case, Alpine's filing of its Complaint on December 10,2010 was well within the allowable fouryear statute of limitations.

V.

The City's contentions that Alpine failed to properly exhaust its administrative
remedies and that Alpine's actions were "voluntary" are without merit.
A.

The voluntariness claim.

Citing KMST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003), the City argues
that Alpine's expenditure of in excess oftwo million dollars to acquire the Timbers complex and
acceptance of severe restrictions on its ownership rights were "voluntary", thereby relieving the
City of any liability. At the outset, it is noteworthy that, when advancing its statute of limitations
arguments, the City repeatedly characterizes Ordinance 819 as imposing mandatory and nondiscretionary community housing requirements on Alpine. The City then reverses its position
and argues that Alpine somehow could have refused to comply with this mandatory and nondiscretionary ordinance and that Alpine's failure to do so results in its compliance with the
Ordinance having been "voluntary". In any event, the facts of KMSTbear no resemblance to the
facts of this case.
In KMST, the Court found that the Ada County Highway District Staff had no authority to
impose upon KMST the condition that a new road be constructed as part of the proposed
development. KMST, 138 Idaho at 582, 67 P.3d at 61. In other words, the Court found that there
was no ordinance or statutory requirement that KMST dedicate or construct the road in question.
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Instead, the Court cited the District Court finding that "representatives included the construction
and dedication of Bird Street in the application because they were concerned that failing to do so
would delay closing on the property and development of the propeliy." Id
In contrast to KMST, it is indisputable that Alpine's development applications were
subject to Ordinance 819 and that, as the City readily concedes elsewhere in its Brief, Alpine's
compliance with Ordinance 819 was mandatory. The Ordinance was in place when Alpine filed
its Applications. By its terms, the Ordinance was not discretionary and Alpine Village clearly
fell within its purview because the project consisted predominantly of "residential units". Both
the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission and the McCall City Council found that the
Applications were subject to the requirements of the Ordinance. The City Council required, as a
condition of approval, that Alpine present a final Community Housing Plan with its Final Plat
and that the Plan be incorporated into a recorded Development Agreement. When the Mountain
Central Board of Realtors lawsuit was filed, the City elected to continue to apply the Ordinance
to the Alpine Village Applications rather than to suspend it. The City rejected Alpine's initial
plan to utilize propeliy which it already owned to satisfy the off-site community housing
component and required Alpine to identify its' off-site community housing units. The City was
specifically aware that Alpine was acquiring the Timbers units solely to comply with the
requirements of the Ordinance. The City's assertion that Alpine's compliance with Ordinance
819 was "voluntary" is completely unsupported by the undisputed facts of record.
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B.

The exhaustion argument.

The City also contends that Alpine failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by failing
to inform the City that Ordinance 819 was unlawful or seek an amendment to the Development
Plan as provided in the McCall City Code §3.1O.12. Both arguments should be rejected. As to
Alpine's supposed obligation to inform the City that the Community Housing Ordinance was
unlawful, the City conveniently neglects to point out that, prior to the City Council's very first
review and consideration of Alpine's Applications, the Mountain Central Board of Realtors had
initiated its litigation against the City, challenging the very authority ofthe City to impose the
Community Housing requirements. The City Council was, thus, fully on notice that its
Ordinances might be unlawful before it began its review of the Applications. Citing the
Mountain Central Board of Realtors litigation, the City declared a moratorium on all new land
use applications and building permits pending the outcome ofthe litigation. In further
recognition of the Alountain Central Board ofRealtors litigation, the City required a limited
release of claims to be included in Alpine's Development Agreement with City. However, the
City did not take any of the steps that could have prevented this litigation, such as accepting
Alpine's initially proposed and less intrusive Community Housing Plan or suspending the
application of the Ordinance to Alpine's Applications. On the other side ofthe table, Alpine had
invested significant time and financial resources in the Applications. It had attempted without
success to gain approval of a much less intrusive Community Housing Plan, which would have
deferred any property acquisitions until well after the conclusion ofthe Mountain Central Board
ofRealtors litigation. It had absolutely no way of knowing how long that litigation would drag
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on. Alpine was offered only two choices by the City: abandon its Applications, or comply with
the Ordinance by putting forth a plan which designated all of the required community housing
units for all phases ofthe Alpine Village Project. Given these facts, it is disingenuous ofthe City
to suggest that Alpine was legally obligated to "proceed under protest". Simply put, the City was
well aware of the risk it was taking.
The City also argues that Alpine failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by not
seeking an amendment under the McCall City Code §3.1 0.12. 10 This Code section allows a party
to seek an amendment to a "Final Development Plan" after the Plan has received final approval.
The Final Development Plan is part of the Planned Unit Development approval process under
Title 3 ofthe McCall City Code. As such, it is distinct and separate from the Subdivision
approval process, which is provided for in Title 9 of the Code, in which the Community Housing
Ordinances were contained. The City is apparently confusing the PUD Final Development Plan
with the Alpine Village Development Agreement. The Community Housing requirements which
are at the heart of this action were triggered by Alpine's subdivision applications (i.e.
preliminary and final plat) and were memorialized in the Development Agreement between the
City and Alpine. The Development Agreement was required by McCall City Code §9.6.06 1l . In
sum, McCall City Code §3.1 0.12 has nothing to do with the community housing requirements of
the McCall City Code or the Development Agreement in which Alpine's Community Housing
Plan was memorialized. As such, no amount of amendments to the PUD Final Development
Plan could have relieved Alpine from the mandatory Community Housing requirements.
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In its Appellant's Brief, Alpine asselis that, in any event, Alpine was exempt from any
exhaustion requirements because the City clearly acted outside its authority in requiring
compliance with the requirements of the Community Housing Ordinances. The City
acknowledges that there is an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement
when an agency has acted outside its authority. Respondent's Briefat 25. However, the City
then argues that, "A review of this Court's decisions strongly suggest that this exception applies
only to facial challenges." Id. That broad assertion is not well taken.

12

Moreover, it is important

to recognize the one significant fact which distinguishes this case from those cited by the City on
this issue; namely, that the law of this case is that the City clearly acted outside of its authority
and arbitrarily and capriciously in imposing the Community Housing Ordinances on Alpine. In
the Mountain Central Board ofRealtors final decision, the District Court found that the
Community Housing Ordinances attempted to regulate a landowner's ownership rather than use
of property, that the City lacked authority to impose the Ordinances, and that the Ordinances
were an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the City's police powers. The City concedes that
when an agency strays outside of its authority, the action may be challenged without
exhaustion.13 This issue has been fully and finally resolved against the City and is the law of this

Section 3.1 0.12 of the McCall City Code is attached hereto as Addendum l.
Section 9.6.06 is part of Title 9 "Subdivisions" and is attached hereto as Addendum 2.
IZ See, for example, Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 963 (2008). Locsha Falls brought
constitutional challenges to certain IDT regulations, which the District Court dismissed for the failure of Losch a
Falls to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Supreme Comi considered Lochsa Fall's "outside agency
authority" exemption to the exhaustion requirement, even though the court characterized the constitutional taking
challenges as "as applied" challenges.
13 Respondent's Brie/at 26.
10
11
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case. This fact alone distinguishes this case and suggests that the "outside agency authority"
exemption would apply to Alpine's claims.
VI.

Alpine was not required to seek judicial review of the City's approval of its
applications under the Local Land Use Planning Act.
I.e. §67-6521(2)(b) states as follows:
(b) An affected person claiming "just compensation" for a perceived "taking," the
basis of the claim being that a final action restricting private propeliy
development is actually a regulatory action by local government deemed
"necessary to complete the development of the material resources ofthe state," or
necessary for other public uses, may seek a judicial determination of whether the
claim comes within defined provisions of section 14, miicle I, of the constitution
of the state of Idaho relating to eminent domain. Under these circumstances, the
affected person is exempt from the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and
may seek judicial review through an inverse condemnation action specifying
neglect by local government to provide "just compensation" under the provisions
of Section 14, Article I, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and Chapter 7,
Title 7, Idaho Code.
The City argues that I.C. § 67-6521(2)(b) does not exempt Alpine from the obligation to

seek judicial review under I.C. §67-6521(1). In support ofthis position, the City relies upon the
holding in KMST, LLC v. County ofAda. Such reliance is misplaced. In KMST, the District
court addressed KMST's claim that the developer's dedication of a street and the later imposition
by the Ada County Highway District of impact fees constituted a taking. The District Court
accepted KMST's argument that I.C. §67-6521 (2) (b) exempted KMST from exhausting its
administrative remedies before judicially challenging the Highway District's calculation ofthe
fees. This Court disagreed, holding:
By its terms, that statute [§ 67-6521(2)(b)] has no application to the impact fees
imposed in this case. It only applies if the basis of the inverse condemnation
claim is "that a specific zoning action or permitting action restricting private
property development is actually a regulatory action by local government deemed
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'necessary to complete the development of the material resources of the state,' or
necessary for other public uses." (emphasis added).
KMST 138 Idaho at 584, 67 P.3d at 63.
As this Court clearly stated in the KMST decision, the Highway District had no authority
to approve or reject the developer's application or to impose any conditions of approval on the
application. The proposed street dedication was found to be a completely voluntary action by the
developer. Moreover, the Highway District's Ordinance which authorized the imposition of
impact fees provided an administrative procedure for challenging those fees. In this case, the
City clearly had final authority over Alpine's Applications and its imposition of the Community
Housing Ordinance on Alpine as a mandatory and non-discretionary condition was clearly part
of its regulatory process. Additionally, under the Local Land Use Planning Act, only cities and
counties are "local governrnents.,,14 Thus, this Court's holding in KMSTthat the judicial review
exemption ofI.C. §67-6521(2)(b) was not applicable to the ordinances of a highway district is
not surprising on this basis alone. In any event, the plain language ofI.C. §67-6521 (2)(b) does
make the exemption applicable to the regulatory actions of the City of McCall in this case; and,
the KMST decision is in accord with that conclusion.
The City fmiher argues that I.C. §67-6521(2)(b) is aimed at facilitating only taking
challenges that are based on the allegation that the taking was not for a legitimate public use,
which, by inference, would not include Alpine's takings claim. Respondents Brie/at 12, fn. 8. In
support of this interpretation of the statute, the City claims that the statutory language ofI.C.

14

I.e. §67-6503. Every city and county shall exercise the powers conferred by this chapter.
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§67-6521 (2)(b) is "obtuse" and that this Court should therefore resOli to the Statute's legislative
history for clarification. To the contrary, the language ofI.C. §67-6521 (2)(b) is clear and
unambiguous and as such, resort to legislative history is neither required nor appropriate.
It is well established that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. (citing Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg'l Afed Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 (2011).

Peck v. State, Dept. ojTransp., 278 P.3d 439, 448 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012).
Nothing in the language of I.C. §67-6521 (2)(b) remotely suggests that the judicial review
exemption of the Statute is limited to taking claims alleging the taking is not for a legitimate
public use. The Statute's language clearly exempts those claims for compensation for a taking
based upon a regulatory action by a local government deemed necessary for a public use. It is
undisputed that the Community Housing Ordinance was a regulatory action deemed necessary by
the City for a public use. It is further undisputed that the second Amended Complaint of Alpine
Village alleges a cause of action against the City claiming compensation for a taking under the
provisions of Section 14, Article I of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho. As such, I.C. §676521(2)(b) exempts Alpine from the requirements of judicial review required by I.C. §676521(1) and pelTI1its Alpine's judicial review through a direct action for inverse condemnation.

VII.

Alpine's takings claims under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution satisfy
the ripeness requirements of Williamson COllnty Reg 'I Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. IS
The City correctly argues that the ripeness tests which were articulated by the U.S.

Supreme Court in the Williamson County decision are applicable exclusively to Alpine's federal
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takings claims. Williamson County established a two pronged ripeness test. The first prong
requires that the decision of the governing body being challenged be a "final decision". The
second prong requires that Alpine have sought and been denied compensation under a state
constitutional inverse condemnation claim. Alpine's federal claim meets both ripeness tests.

A.

The "final decision" requirement.

The City's argument regarding the "final decision" ripeness requirement appears to be
that, first, Alpine's acquisition of the Timbers complex and compliance with Ordinance 819 was
"voluntary" and, second, that Alpine failed to "probe alternatives to proceeding with the
Timbers ... " Respondent's Briefat 30-32. The fundamental factual and legal flaws in the City's
continued and inconsistent assertion that Alpine's compliance with the Ordinance was
"voluntary" have been discussed above and will not be repeated here. 16 The assertion that
Alpine failed to probe alternatives to the acquisition of the Timbers is unequivocally false.
Alpine initially submitted a Community Housing Plan which proposed to construct some
units on-site and to convert mobile horne rental spaces already owned by Alpine to rent restricted
spaces on an "interim" basis. The Plan proposed to replace those mobile horne spaces with
permanent off-site units within three years after Phase 3 ofthe Alpine Village project was final
platted. R, Ex. II (Ex. 4). Under this Plan, none of the on-site units would have been constructed
and no permanent off-site units would have been acquired or constructed until after the
conclusion ofthe Mountain Central Board of Realtors litigation. As the City acknowledges in
its Respondent's Brief, that Plan was rejected by the City. Respondent's Briefat 9. Alpine was
15

473 U.S. 172,105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985)
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directed to present a new Plan which designated the permanent off-site units. It is difficult to
reconcile the City's argument that Alpine failed to probe alternatives to the acquisition of the
Timbers with these uncontroverted facts. To the extent that the "final decision" prong of

Williamson County did, in fact, require Alpine to probe alternative and less intrusive means of
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819, which is far from clear, Alpine
unquestionably did so. When its attempts were rebuffed by the City, it proposed a Plan which fell
squarely within the express parameters of Ordinance 819.17
B.

Alpine has properly sought compensation under the Article 14, Section 1 of
the Constitution of the State of Idaho, in satisfaction of the second
Williamson ripeness test.

The City argues that Alpine has failed to meet the second prong of Williamson County
because Alpine failed to seek judicial review under the Local Land Use Planning Act within 28
days after the project received final approval from the City and because Alpine's state takings

16

See discussion above at Section V.

17 The City appears to acknowledge that a variance fi-om the requirements of Ordinance 819 was not available to

Alpine. Instead, the City's argument is that the "failure to probe alternatives" is analogous to the failure to seek a
variance which was the case in Williamson. Tn any event, Alpine concurs that neither the McCall City Code, nor the
Local Land Use Planning Act would have allowed a variance fi'om the requirements of Ordinance 819 to be granted.
The tenn "variance" as utilized in a land uselzoning context is limited in scope and would not be a proceeding
available to Alpine to seek relief from the Community Housing requirements mandated by City. Under the Local
Land Use Planning Act, a variance is limited to matters relating to the size and setbacks oflots, heights of buildings
or provisions affecting the size, shape or placement of structures on a lot. I.C. §67-6516. " ... A variance is a
modification of the bulk and placement requirements of the ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front
yard, side yard, rear yard, setbacks, parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance provision affecting the
size or shape of a structure or the placement of the structure upon lots, or the size of lots." Likewise, the McCall City
Code defines variance as "The relaxation of an otherwise applicable dimensional requirement." McCall City Code
§3.3.02. The McCall City Code also restricts the types of variances authorized. McCall City Code §3.13.012 "(C)
Modification Of Requirements: A variance may be granted modifYing the requirements of this title respecting: lot
width; lot depth; front, side, and rear yard setbacks; lot coverage; parking space; height of buildings; or other
ordinance provisions affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement of the structure upon lots, or the size
or shape oflots. A variance may not be used to authorize a land use not otherwise allowed in the applicable zone or
to increase the density of development beyond that which is authorized in the comprehensive plan."
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claim was not timely filed. Both of these arguments have been addressed in Alpine's Appellant's
Briefand above in this Appellant's Reply Brief 18 Alpine has, in fact, proceeded in strict

compliance with the U.S. Supreme COlili's decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County
a/San Francisco, et al., 545 U.S. 323, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 162 L. Ed. 2d 315 (2005). Alpine has

joined its state inverse condemnation/takings claim with its federal takings claims. In the event
that compensation is denied to Alpine under the state claim, the federal claims will become ripe.

VIII. Alpine's federal takings claims are timely under I.e. §5-219(4).
The City's strained and tortuous argument that Alpine's federal claims are untimely turns
on the assertion that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in Levald, Inc. v. City ofPalm
Desert, 998 Fold 680, 687 (9 th Cir. 1993) and Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City ofMorgan
Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (2003) apply only to causes of action filed in federal court. According to the

City, this is the "precise holding of San Remo." Respondent's Brief at 40. To the contrary, there
is no suppOli in the San Remo decision for this proposition. This was recognized by the District
Court when it rejected this very argument. This was also recognized by the Honorable B. Lynn
Winmill, Chief United States District Judge, who in his Decision remanding this case reasoned
that:
The accrual of a federal takings claims turns on the exhaustion of state remedies:
"[T]he date of accrual is either (1) the date compensation is denied in state courts,
or (2) the date the ordinance is passed if resort to state courts is futile." Hacienda
Valley Mobile Estates v. City ofMorgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (2003), (citing Levald,
Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 Fold 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993)). There is no
contention that the exhaustion requirement is futile here. Therefore, Alpine

18

See Appellant's Briefat 16-29; See discussion at Sections IV and VI above.
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Village's federal claim does not accrue until compensation is denied in state
court, and it appears that the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run.

R., Ex. II (Ex. 29, at p. 6).
In an accompanying footnote, Judge Winmill specifically rejected the argument being
made by the City in this appeal:
The City argues that Hacienda Valley jWabile Estates and Levald apply only
"with respect to a federal claim brought first in federal court." (cite omitted). But
the Ninth Circuit's rationale is at least as strong in the context of a state case
removed to federal court. Id at fn. 2.
The precise argument being made by the City herein was also rejected by the United
States District COUli for the Western District of Washington in the post-San Rema decision,
Olhausen v. City afSammamish, 2011 Westlaw 683902. Therein, the propeliy owner spent three

years litigating its state takings claim. After ultimately been denied compensation under the state
claim, the property owner then initiated a federal takings claim in federal comi. The District
Court rejected the City's argument that the claim accrued when the property owner's subdivision
application was denied and that, therefore, the applicable three year statute of limitations on the
federal takings claim had run. Citing Levald, the District Court held that the federal claim did
not accrue until compensation was denied in the state court proceedings.
After removing this case to federal court and in its briefing in opposition to Alpine's
motion to remand the case, one of the arguments offered by the City against remand was that
remand to state court "would risk misapplication of controlling federal law." R., Ex. II (Ex. 27, at
pp. 1,5). In its arguments regarding the application ofI.C. §5-219(4) to Alpine's federal takings
claims, it would appear that this is precisely what the City is inviting this Comi to do.
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IX.

The City's actions effectuated a temporary taking for which Alpine is entitled to
receive compensation.
The City acknowledges in its Respondent's Briefthat temporary takings claims are

recognized by the Idaho COUlis 19 and the United States Supreme Court?O However, citing

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002) and Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004), the City
argues that temporary takings are limited only to situations in which there is a "total deprivation"
of all use of the property.21 Although this limitation may apply to certain types of takings
claims, it is inapplicable to Alpine's claim.

Tahoe-Sierra presented the question of whether a moratorium on development imposed
during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan for Lake Tahoe constituted a per

se taking of property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The court was, thus, presented with a Lucas regulatory taking case regarding
which the COUli held, "[t]he categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states that compensation is
required when a regulation deprives an owner of "all economically beneficial uses" of his land.

Id., at 1019, 112 S. Ct. 2886". Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,

19 McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm 'rs, 128 Idaho 213,912 P.2d 100 (1996). McCuskey claim for temporary
taking arose between the time a stop work order requiring McCuskey to cease construction of a convenience store
was issued and the time the Court declared invalid, the county ordinance that the stoop work order was based upon.
20 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388, 96
L.Ed. 2d 250 (1987) "If a regulation of private property that amount to a taking is later invalidated, this action
converts the taking to a "temporary" one for which the government must pay the landowner forth value of the use of
the land during that period"
21 See Respondent's Brie/at 45 citing as authority Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 27

535 U.S. 302, 330, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1483, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002.) 22 In Moon, this Court was
also presented with a Lucas regulatory taking.
The taking asserted then, is in the nature of a regulatory taking, but the plaintiffs
have not claimed a permanent deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of
their land. As such, under the Idaho Constitution, which does not allow less than
a total deprivation of use or denial of access, and under Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 112
S. Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798, there is no taking in violation of the state or the
federal constitution. See also Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, et at., 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517
(2002).

Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536,542,96 P.3d 637,643 (2004).
While these decisions may, indeed, be relevant to Lucas takings claims, what the City
fails to recognize is that Alpine has not asserted a Lucas takings claim. Rather, Alpine has
suffered a Loretto, per se physical taking. 23 This is a very impOliant distinction, the significance
of which was acknowledged in both the Tahoe-Sierra and Moon decisions.
In Tahoe-Sierra, the court recognized that per se Loretto taking claims require an entirely
different analysis from those raised under Lucas:
When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for
some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner,
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809
(1951), regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel
or merely a part thereof. Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is
taken and the government occupies the property for its own purposes, even
though that use is temporary. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327
U.S. 372, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946). Similarly, when the government
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Lucas
was a regulatory action deemed to be a per se taking where regulations completely deprive an owner of all
economically beneficial use of property,
23
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,440, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3178, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868
(1982). Loretto holds that a regulation that authorizes a physical occupation of property by third parties is a taking.
22
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appropriates part of a rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment
tenants, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct.
3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); or when its planes use private airspace to approach
a government airport, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90
L.Ed. 1206 (1946), it is required to pay for that share no matter how small. ...
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on
the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it
inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents
for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a "regulatory taking," and vice
versa. For the same reason that we do not ask whether a physical appropriation
advances a substantial government interest or whether it deprives the owner of all
economically valuable use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical
takings context to regulatory takings claims.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.

Likewise in Moon, the alleged taking was a regulatory, Lucas type taking. In Moon, this
Court expressly noted that a temporary physical, Loretto type taking is compensable whether or
not it pelmanently deprives the property owner of all economically beneficial uses of the
property.24 Thus, the holdings in Tahoe-Sierra and Moon are not inconsistent with Alpine's
position in this case.
The City next argues that no temporary taking occurred in this case because, "After all,
Alpine still owns the Timbers, and the City acted promptly and without prodding to release
Alpine from any requirements imposed in the development Agreements." Respondent's Brie/at
44. This is the same argument which was rejected by the Supreme Court in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church a/Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 321, 107

S. Ct. 2378, 2389, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1987), in which the Court held that, once a taking is

24 See Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 541-42, 96 P.3d 637, 642-43 (2004).
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established, "no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."
The City does not dispute that under Loretto, where government requires an owner to
suffer a permanent physical invasion of its property, a per se taking will be deem to have
occurred. Rather, the City simply argues that Loretto and Kaiser Aetna, 25 which were cited by
Alpine, bear no resemblance to the taking which resulted from the application of Ordinance 819
to Alpine's project. Respondent's Brief at 46, and tn 36.
In Loretto, the United States Supreme Court held that a New York statute which provided
that a landlord must permit a cable TV provider to install its cable TV facilities on the landlord's
property and further provided that the landlord could not demand payment from the cable TV
provider in excess of an amount deemed by a state commission to be reasonable, constituted a
taking. The Loretto court recognized the historical and traditional view that a government
regulation which authorized the occupation of propeliy by a third party constituted a taking. The
physical occupation condemned in Loretto as a per se taking consisted of the use of a small
portion of a rooftop for the installation of cable TV facilities. By way of contrast, the protected
property interests which were taken from Alpine consisted of Alpine's money, Alpine's right to
dispose of its property, Alpine's right to freely exclude others from the property and to determine
who will occupy the property.

25

Kaiser Aetna v. U. S., 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383,62 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1979)
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Likewise in Kaiser Aetna, the court found a taking where the government imposed a
navigational servitude upon Kaiser Aetna's private waterway, thus creating an easement the
public could enjoy. The court held,
In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests
that the Government cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in
which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will
cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather, the
imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina.
Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179.
In both Loretto and Kaiser Aetna, the takings resulted from a regulation that subjected a
property owner to a physical invasion by third parties of a fundamental property right.
Conversely, regulations which merely regulate the use ofproperty may not constitute a taking.
Our holding today is very nan-ow. We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent
physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the property owner
entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of
the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of
property regulation. We do not, however, question the equally substantial
authority upholding a State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon
an owner's use of his propeliy.
Loretto v. Teleprompter A1anhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3179, 73
L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982).
Despite the City'S invitation to do so, it is not necessary or appropriate in this case to
debate the issue of whether Ordinance 819 merely regulated Alpine's use of its property. That
issue was resolved in the District Court's decision in Mountain Central Board ofRealtors at
pages 29 to 30:
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However, the City of McCall's requirement that twenty percent of new
subdivisions be deed-restricted community housing regulates much more than a
landowner's "use" of his or her property. The restrictions for community housing
dictate the price for which the property may be sold and to whom the property
may be sold ... These restrictions go much further than merely regulating the use
of property; instead they essentially regulate ownership of the property by
dictating to whom a unit may be sold or rented.
Thus, as established by the decision in jl;[ountain Central Board ofRealtors the taking
which occurred in this case falls squarely within the Loretto per se category of takings. In such
case, the taking is compensable despite being only "temporary". 26

x.

Alpine did not release or waive its takings claims.
The City argues that Alpine has waived and released the City from the takings claims

which are at issue in this case by means of the language in the Alpine Village Development
Agreement. Respondent's Brief at 28. However, the language of the Development Agreement is
clear and unambiguous. The City required Alpine to release only those claims "as to the
Commlmity Housing Units which are sold pursuant to this Plan prior to the final disposition of
such litigation." R, Ex. II (Ex. 16, Section VII) (i.e. the Mountain Central Board ofRealtors
litigation). No units were sold prior to the final disposition of the litigation. This limited release
is what was bargained for by the parties, with input and review by the City attorney. Having
rejected Alpine's less intrusive Community Housing Plan and elected to continue to impose

26 The City's reliance on Yee v. City ofEscondido, 503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522 (1992) is also misplaced. The
critical factual predicate of the Court's decision in Yee was that the property owners were not required to subject
themselves to the Ordinance, in that the property owners were not required to rent to mobile home owners. Alpine,
in contrast, had no such choice. The City controlled and dictated to whom Alpine could rent or sell the Timbers
units and at what price.
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Ordinance 819 on Alpine despite the Mountain Central challenge, the City was well aware of the
risk which it was taking.
The City invites this Court to read language into the Release for which there is no basis in
the document or in the record before the Court, suggesting in support of its argument that:
The City reasonably relied on this language to protect it ... Rather than delaying or
denying pending applications, this language was intended to allow Applications
like Alpine's to proceed without financial risk to the City. It is safe to assume that
the City would have never entered into this contract and approved the project if it
thought that Alpine reserved the right to sue the City despite the City's
compliance with the terms of the deal.

Respondent's Brief at 29.
The City does not support these assertions with any cites to the record. That is because
the record is devoid of any evidence which would substantiate any of these statements.

XI.

The City's other equitable arguments are without merit.
At pages 41-43 of its Respondent's Brief, the City offers a veritable laundry list of

additional equitable arguments as to why Alpine should be denied relief in this case. These
arguments are premised on flawed factual assertions which are refuted by the record and have
been addressed elsewhere in this Brief.

XII.

The City is not entitled to an award of attorneys fees on appeal.
The City argues that, if it prevails in this litigation, it should be awarded its attorneys fees

under I.C. §12-117 and 42 U.S.C.A. §1988. I.C. §12-117 provides for an award of fees only if
the non-prevailing party's claims or causes of action were pursued without reasonable basis in
fact or law. The Court of Appeals has held that: "Where questions of law are raised, attorney
fees should be awarded under I. C. § 12-121 only if the nonprevailing party advocates a plainly
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fallacious, and, therefore, not fairly debatable, position.,,27 Given the complexity of the legal
issues presented by this case, and the uniqueness of the underlying facts, Alpine would
respectfully submit that, regardless of the outcome of this appeal, it cannot be found that
Alpine's position was pursued without reasonable basis in fact or law or that Alpine's positions
were not, at a minimum, fairly debatable. 28 The District Court concurred. After this appeal was
filed, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision on (1)Defendant 's Memorandum of

Costs and Attorneys Fees and (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attorneys Fees and Costs.
Therein, the Court denied the City's Motion for an award of fees under I.C. § 12-117, finding that
Alpine had not pursued its claims without reasonable basis in law or fact. The District's Court's
analysis and reasoning would be applicable to the City's request on appeal.
The City also references 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 as a basis for its request for fees, asserting
that the standard tmder that statute is "functionally the same as I.C. § 12-117". Respondent's

Briefat 48. In fact, the standard for awards of attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C.A. §1988 to
prevailing defendants is even more demanding even than the standard under I.C. §12-117, with
something akin to frivolousness being the required finding. 29

Lowery v. Board of County Commissioners for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64,69, 764 P.2d 431,437 (Ct. App. 1988)
After this appeal was filed, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision on (1) Defendant's
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees and (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attorneys Fees and Costs.
Therein, the Court denied the City's Motion for an award offees under I.C. § 12-117, finding that Alpine had not
pursued its claims without reasonable basis in law or fact. No appeal has been taken from that decision, which is
attached as Addendum 3.
27

28
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in Alpine's Appellant's Brief, the District Court's
Decision should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the District Court to determine
the amount of compensation to which Alpine is entitled.
~/I;.
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Sterling Codifiers, Inc.
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Addendum 1
3.10.12: AMENDMENTS TO FINAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN:

(A) Subsequent Amendments:
1. Any subsequent amendment to the final development plan changing location, siting,
and height of buildings and structures may be authorized by the commission, without
additional public hearings, if required by engineering or other circumstances not
foreseen at the time the final plan was approved.
2. In no case shall the commission authorize changes which may cause any of the
following:
(a) A change in the use or character of the development, including ownership.
(b) An increase in overall coverage of structures or significant changes in types of
structures.
(c) An increase of the intensity of use or types of usage.
(d) An increase in the problems of traffic circulation and public utilities.
(e) A reduction of off street parking and loading space.
(f) A reduction in required pavement widths.

(8) Change Requiring Public Hearing: All other changes in use, rearrangement of lots,
blocks and building tracts, or in the proVision of common open spaces and changes in
addition to those listed above which constitute substantial alteration of the original plan
shall require a public hearing before the commission and approval by the council.

(C) Expiration:
1. On the anniversary year after general development plan and program approval, until
the project is complete, the applicants or applicants' successors, shall file a progress
report. If substantial construction or development has not taken place within four (4)
years from the date of approval of the general development plan and program, the
commission shall review the PUD program at a public hearing to determine whether or
not its continuation, in whole or in part, is in the public interest, and, if found not to be,
shall recommend to the council that the PUD approval be revoked.
2. After action by the commission, the council shall consider the matter and by resolution
accept or reject it or return it to the commission for further action. Notice and hearing
shall be provided according to the same procedures as are then applicable to a new
application, with the present owner of the property being sent notice by certified mail,
return receipt requested; the city is entitled to rely on the county tax assessor's records
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Addendum 1
and a title company title search for the name and address of the current owner(s).
(Ord. 821,2-23-2006, eff. 3-16-2006)
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Addendum 2

9.S.0S: DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS:
All provisions of this section, and sections 9.6.07, 9.6.08, 9.6.09 and 9.6.10 of this chapter
are mandatory, and may not be altered by a development agreement. The obligations
contained in these four (4) sections shall be enforceable by methods of enforcement of
ordinances, as well as under the law respecting contracts; the doctrine of election of
remedies shall have no application.
In addition to the objectives outlined in chapter 1 of this title, provisions to allow the city and
developers to enter into development agreements are included in these subdivision
regulations to achieve the following purposes:

(A) To assure the city and the applicant that the development will be of greater community
benefit and that, in turn for providing needed facilities, improvements or services, the
applicant will be able to plan for and proceed with development.

(8) To provide a procedure whereby developers of large scale and/or multi-use projects may
continue with the development of such projects in accordance with the rules, regulations
and policies of the city as such existed at the time the development agreement was
adopted, notwithstanding subsequent changes in such rules, regulations, and policies
which may occur during the time frame of the development agreement subject to and in
compliance with conditions of approval.

(C) To enable the city to more accurately plan and budget for necessary public
improvements in full confidence that development will proceed in a timely and phased
manner in accordance with the provisions of the development agreement.

(0) To strengthen the public planning process, encourage private participation in
comprehensive planning and reduce the economic costs of development. (Ord. 822, 2-23
-2006, eff. 3-16-2006)
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3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC~·M-STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

5
6

ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,

1

a

Plaintfff,

9

vs,

10
11

Case No. CV-2010-519C
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
(1) DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
(2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS

CITY OF MCCALL,
Defendant.

12

13

APPEARANCES

14

For Plaintiff: Steven J. Milfemann of Mil/emann Pittenger McMahan &
Pemberton, LLP

15
16
17

For Defendant: Christopher H_ Meyer of Givens Pursley, LLP

This matter came before the Court on (1) Defendant's Memorandum of Costs

18

and Attorney Fees and Costs and (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees. By
19

stipulation, the parties submitted their written arguments to the Court for decision
2Q

21
22

without hearing.

BACKGROUND

23

This case arises from an application Plaintiff made to the City for a pianned unit

24

development ("PUD") and subdivision in McCall caJled Alpine Village. On February 23,

25

2006, the City of McCall, hereinafter referred to as "the City" passed Ordinance 819.

26
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1
2

which required developers of residential subdivisions to set aside 20% of their planned
units for "community housing'\ that is, restricted housing for low-income residents.

3

On June 20, 2006, Plaintiff filed their applications with the Planning and Zoning

4

Commission seeking to develop a mixed use residential and commercial property (The

5

"Alpine Village").

6

Meanwhile, Mountain Center Board of Realtors, Inc. had filed an action against

7

the City of McCall in Valley County Case No. 2006-490~C, seeking the Court there to

B

declare, inter alia, Ordinance 819 as facially unconstitutional (the "MCBR litigation").

9

On March 12,2007, Plaintiff presented a revised community housing plan to the
10

City Council wherein Plaintiff would elect to provide the off-site units by purchasing a
11
12

17-unit apartment complex known as "The Timbers" and converting the units into

13

community housing condominiums. The McCall City Council approved the revised plan

14

on March 22, 2007, Plaintiff closed on the purchase of The Timbers on April 16, 2007,

15

and the parties entered into a Development Agreement with Plaintiff for Alpine ViUage

16

on December 13, 2007.

17
18

On February 19, 2007, Fourth District Judge Thomas Neville ruled in the MCBR
litigation that Ordinance 819, McCall City Code § 9.7.10., was an unconstitutional tax.

19

Subsequent to that decision, the City entered into the First Amendment to Development
20

Agreement on July 24, 2008, wherein the City deleted Article VII of the original
21
22

development agreement and lifted the restrictions that Ordinance 819 had imposed

23

upon Plaintiffs property at Alpine Village. The City further lifted the community housing

24

restrictions on Plaintiff's property at The Timbers on May 21, 2009.

25

On November 15, 2010, Plaintiff sent a written demand letter to the City seeking

26
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1
2

3

payment of damages it had incurred in purchasing The Timbers in order to comply with
now invalidated Ordinance 819. The City did not respond to Plaintiffs demand, and
Plaintiff commenced suit against the City in this case on December 10, 2010.

4

On December 16, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision on the

5

parties' Motions for Summary Judgment and determined that I.C. § 50-219 barred

6

Plaintiffs state inverse condemnation claim.

7
8

The Court also found that Plaintiffs

remaining federal claims were barred as unripe by either requirement set forth in
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473

9

U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985).
10

following the entry of judgment dismissing Plaintiffs action, Defendant filed its
11
12

Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees requesting attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §

13

12-121 and I.C. § 12-117. Therein, Defendant contended that Plaintiff commenced this

14

litigation "without a reasonable basis in fact or law" and that the Plaintiff pursued this

15

case "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." In return, Plaintiff filed a Motion

16

to Disallow Attorney Fees, wherein it asserted that the complex nature of Plaintiffs

17

claims and the Court's analysis in reaching its decision showed that Plaintiff had a

18

reasonable basis in fact or law for bringing this action.

19

DISCUSSION
20

The Defendant argues that it is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs
21
22

23
24

2.5

under Idaho Code §§ 12·117 and 12-121. Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or
political subdivision and a person. the state agency or political subdivision
or the court, as the case may be, shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses,
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in

26
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1
2

3
4
5
6

7
8

factor law.
I.C. § 12-117(1).
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides that:
In any crvif action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal
or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's
fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person,
partnership, corporation, aSSOCiation, private organization, the state of
Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
I.C. § 12-121.

9

Around the time Defendant submitted its Memorandum of Costs and Attorney

10

Fees, the Idaho Supreme Court held that where a party requests attorney's fees

11

pursuant to both I.C. § 12·117 and I.C. § 12~121, the request under I.C. § 12-121 is

12

denied because I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees for

13

the entities to which it applies. KeplerqFleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207 266
I

14

P.3d 1159, 1165 (2012). roh'g denied (Jan. 30, 2012).
15

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff pursued this case ''without a reasonable
16
17

basis in fact or law" and that the Plaintiff pursued this case "frivolously, unreasonably or

18

without foundation."

19

considering that the Plaintiff continued to pursue this litigation despite Defendant's

20

warnings and following this Court's decision in Richard Hehr and Greystone Village,

21

LtC v. City of McCall, Valley County Case No. CV-2010-276·C and Buckskin

22

Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC v. Valley County, Valley County

23

The Defendant further argues that this is particularly true

Case No. CV-2009-554-C. However, as was the case with Buckskin and Hehr, this

24

litigation was not frivolously pursued considering the complex nature of the legal issues
25

involved in this case.
26
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1

This case presented a number of its own challenging legal issues regarding,

inter

2

alia, (1) whether I.C. § 50-219'5 adoption of the notice of claim provisions of the ITCA

3

also carried with it the jurisdictional requirement espoused in case law interpreting I.C. §

4

6-908; (2) when the cause of action for Plaintiffs federal claims accrued; and (3)

5

whether the Plaintiff failed to exhaust its remedies as set out in the case of KMST, LLC

6

v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577 (2003).

7

In reaching its ultimate decision in

Defendant's favor, the Court, as to Plaintiff's federal claims, disagreed with both

8

parties' characterization of the Plaintiff's constitutional challenge as facial and had to
9

engage in an analysis offered by neither party regarding the application of the paired
10
11
12

holdings in San Ramo Hotel, LP. v. City and County of San FranCiSCO, 545 U.S. 323

(2005) and Williamson County to the facts of this case.

13

Although the Court ultimately ruled in the Defendant's favor, the Court cannot

14

say that the Plaintiff pursued this case without a reasonable basis in fact or law as

15

required in order to award fees pursuant to

16

deny the Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees.

17

I.e.

§ 12-117. Therefore. the Court will

CONCLUSION

18

The Court DENIES the Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees
19

and GRANTS the Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Attorn
20
21

DATED this

-t1-

day of March, 2012

22

23
24

25

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION - CASE NO. CV 2010-519(; - PAGE 5

\

Addendum 3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2

, hereby certify that on the
3
4
5

s
7

a
9
10

11
12

13
14

Ji

day of March, 2012, , mailed (served) a true

and correct copy of the within instrument to:
VALLEY COUNTY COURT
V.AEMAIL
Steven J. Millemann
MILLEMANN PITTENGER MCMAHON & PEMBERTON, LLP
706 North First Street
PO Box 1066
McCall. ID 83638
Fax; (208) 634-4516
Christopher H. Meyer
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W Bannock St
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Fax: (208) 388-1300
ARCHIE N. BANBURY
Clerk of the District Court

15

16
17
18

19

20
21

22
23
24
25

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION - CASE NO. CV 2010-519C • PAGE 6

